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Abstract
User identification and authentication is the first and most important aspect of identity 
management in maintaining security and privacy of users and their assets. Due to the 
open nature of the Internet, without reliable identification and authentication, 
subsequent security and privacy protections become worthless. Amid the increase of the 
number of online services and users, identity fraud is on the increase. It has been widely 
reported that identity fraud costs the industry many billions of dollars each year around 
the world.
Perpetrators use false identities to engage in fraudulent activities. False identities can be 
established in one of two ways: (i) creating fictitious identity by manufacturing, forging 
or fraudulently obtaining legitimate documentation to satisfy proof of identity (POI) 
requirements, and (ii) stealing or forging someone else’s identity from an actual person 
(living or dead) such as passwords, security tokens or biometric information.
One of the effective ways to prevent identity fraud is to build defence against the use of 
false identities. Use of false identities can be prevented by implementing strong 
authentication, using multi-factor identity proofing (during service enrolment phase) 
and multifactor identity authentication (during service delivery sessions). To balance 
convenience and security, the strength of the authentication needs to match the required 
level of trust. If the implemented strength is lower than the required level of trust, it may 
introduce risk of fraudulent activities. On the other hand if the implemented strength is 
higher than the required level of trust, it may introduce inconvenience to the user, 
preventing the usage.
To solve this issue, we propose CaMa (Credential Attribute Mapping) models to 
calculate the strength of authentication for multi-factor identity proofing and multi­
factor identity authentication scenarios. The strengths are calculated from the desired 
properties of identities and presented in two ways, (i) a process of summation of the 
weighting index of the desirable properties, and (ii) application of information theory.
Further, a scheme for constructing digital representations of personal identities from 
conventional identity documents such as birth certificates, citizenship certificates, 
passports, driving licences, bank card and photo ID is also proposed. This digital 
representation of personal identity along with the concept of (i) active credentials, (ii)
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trusted identity providers, (iii) secure assertion protocol such as SAML and with the (iv) 
established policies and procedures, enable a user to assert their identity to a remote 
online service provider that request the proof of identity (POI) requirements. Thus, it 
will help freeing users from the limitation of personal presence during service 
enrolment. For example, in this way, it will be possible to open a bank account in the 
USA by remotely submitting trusted identity credentials online from Australia.
